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CHAPTER 22 
Administration of Justice 
ALAN J. DIMOND 
§22.1. Two studies of the judicial system. During the 1962 SURVEY 
year a special legislative commission and a special committee of the 
Massachusetts Bar Association each made careful studies of the judi-
cial system and submitted legislative proposals for its improvement. 
Members of the legislative commission included the deans of the law 
schools of Boston College, Boston University and Harvard as well 
as the presidents of the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations.1 
Dean Erwin N. Griswold of Harvard Law School was the chairman. 
The committee of the Massachusetts Bar Association was headed by 
Dean Robert F. Drinan, S.J., of Boston College Law School. Although 
each group reinforced substantially all the work of the other, neither 
one has yet had any considerable success with its recommendations. 
It may be expected, however, that renewed submission of the proposals 
will produce more positive results. 
A. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
§22.2. Business of the Court. Table I shows the full bench business 
of the Supreme Judicial Court.1 Of particular significance is the in-
crease in the number of cases decided during the past four years. The 
recent pattern of increase is even more evident if we note that for the 
ALAN J. DIMOND is a member of the firm of Bernkopf, Goodman, Houghton and 
Dimond, Boston. He is Secretary of the Massachusetts Bar Association, an asso· 
ciate editor of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly, and author of The Superior Court 
of Massachusetts: Its Origin and Development (1960). 
§22.l. 1 The report of the special legislative commission is House Doc. No. 3535 
(1962). 
§22.2. 1 Statistics in this chapter have been obtained, for the various courts, from 
the offices of Joseph K. Collins, Esq., Executive Secretary to the Justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court; former Chief Justice Paul C. Reardon of the Superior Court; 
and Hon. Kenneth L. Nash, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Dis· 
trict Courts. The statistical year for the Supreme Judicial Court ends on August 31. 
All other statistics in this chapter are for years ending on June 30 unless otherwise 
stated. 
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year 1957-1958, not shown in the Table, the number of cases decided 
was 277. Yet the Court continues to work at an efficient rate. Indeed, 
during the 1962 SURVEY year, being equipped with its full strength of 
seven Justices, the Court was not only able to keep current with its 
caseload but was also able to reduce the prior year's average interval 
between consultation and decision from 142 to 62 days. 
TABLE I 
Full Bench Business of 
the Supreme ]u,dicial Court 
1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 
Cases decided 292 303 314 331 
Advisory opinions I 2 0 2 
Rescripts without opinion 49 31 53 69 
Decision of trial court affirmed 159 192 199 214 
Decision of trial court affirmed 
with modification 8 12 6 9 
Decision of trial court reversed 94 81 84 80 
No decision by trial court 31 18 25 28 
Average interval between 
entry and consultation 123 120 98 97 
Average interval between con-
sultation and decision 63 57 142 62 
Average interval between 
entry and decision 186 177 240 159 
§22.3. Transfer of original causes from the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Originally both a trial as well as an appellate tribunal, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has during the past century been relieved of 
most of its trial work. The changes have been accomplished either 
by assigmng certain matters such as actions of tort and contract and 
libels for divorce to the exclusive jurisdiction of lower courts or by 
conferring jurisdiction on lower courts, concurrently with the Su-
preme Judicial Court, of cases already within the latter's sphere. Sup-
plemental to the second method has been legislation permitting the 
high Court to transfer to lower courts all cases within the concurrent 
jurisdiction.1 Yet as a residual burden on the Supreme Judicial Court, 
various specialized matters, many of which raised complex questions 
of fact and administrative supervision, continued in the Court's exclu-
sive domain. 
New impetus to relieve the Court of some of its remaining original 
business came from the recent increase in the number of appellate 
§22.3. 1 Acts of 1922, c. 532, §1, amending G.L., c. 214, §32; Acts of 1939, c. 257, 
§1, inserting G.L., c. 213, §IA, amended by Acts of 1941, c. 180. 
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cases and the consequent additional strain on the Court's manpower. 
The special state commission during the 1962 SURVEY year accordingly 
recommended, with a draft of legislation, that the Superior Court's 
original jurisdiction and the Supreme Judicial Court's transfer author-
ity be correspondingly enlarged. This proposal was enacted as Chap-
ter 722 of the Acts of 1962, whereby the Supreme Judicial Court is 
empowered to transfer to an appropriate lower court "any cause or 
matter [other than certain specified proceedings] which might other-
wise be disposed of by a single justice, and said lower court shall there-
upon have jurisdiction thereof ... " 2 Non-transferable matters are 
generally proceedings incidental to the high Court's exercise of its ap-
pellate jurisdiction. By the same act the Superior Court is given origi-
nal jurisdiction, concurrently with the Supreme Judicial Court, of all 
matters within the latter's original jurisdiction other than those pro-
vided for under G.L., c. 211, §4, relative to the removal by the full 
bench of certain public officers, and those which are designated by the 
new act as nontransferable. 
B. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
§22.4. Business of the court. Entries in the Superior Court again 
increased but were offset by an even greater number of dispositions. 
The court's ability to do this work was aided by District Court judges 
sitting in the Superior Court on misdemeanor appeals and motor torts, 
by auditors and by the Transfer Act. Table II shows the business of 
the court. Table III shows the average interval between the entry 
and trial of civil jury cases in the ordinary course. December 22, 1961, 
is the latest date for which complete figures are available for this in-
terval. 
TABLE I I 
Superior Court Business 
1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 
Undisposed-of cases be-
ginning of year 56,974 51,774 53,891 55,648 
Entries during year 36,883 39,233 39,878 40,830 
Dispositions during year 42,455 36,774 38,085 44,090 
Undisposed-of cases end 
of year 51,783 53,834 55,648 52,502 
Undisposed-of law cases 
end of year 43,765 45,544 47,521 44,470 
Remaining triable law 
docket end of year 30,294 35,975 37,912 35,550 
2 Section 5 of the act repealed G.L., c. 214, §!l2. 
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TABLE III 
Average Number of Months Interval Between 
Entry and Trial of Civil Jury Cases 1 
§22.4 
July 1, 19J9 July 1, 1960 April 1, 1961 Dec. 22, 1961 
Barnstable 
Original 
Removed 
Berkshire 
Original 
Removed 
Bristol 
Taunton 
Original 
Removed 
New Bedford 
Original 
Removed 
Fall River 
Original 
Removed 
Essex 
Salem 
Original 
Removed 
Lawrence 
Original 
Removed 
Newburyport 
Original 
Removed 
Franklin 
Original 
Removed 
Hampden3 
Original 
Removed 
Hampshire 
Original 
Removed 
29 
10 
21 
21 
9 
11 
11 
11 
12 
7 
14 
14 
15 
16 
9 
9 
8 
13 
11 
11 
11 
7 
10 
28 
11 
14 
10 
12! 
17 
9 
12 
12 
10 
14 14 
27 
16 20! 
17 21 
15 16 
17 192 
12 16 
12 8 
16 15 
11 12! 
13 15 
§22.4. 1 For 1960. 1961 and 1962. original and removed cases are not separated. 
since the repeal of the Fielding Act (requiring all motor tort cases to be started in 
a District Court) on September I. 1958. has made the separation statistically un-
important. 
2 Thirteen months on June 30. 1962. 
3 The last three columns for Hampden County are exclusive of motor torts. for 
which the intervals were 19 months in the second and third columns and 18 months 
in the fourth column. In April. 1962. the interval for motor torts was 12 months. 
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July 1,1959 July 1,1960 April 1, 1961 Dec. 22, 1961 
Middlesex 
Cambridge 
Original 16 15 21 21 Removed 12 
Lowell 
Original 14 12 15 12 Removed 12 
Norfolk 
Original 13 13 17 18 Removed 14 
Plymouth 
Plymouth 
Original 12 13 23 24-1 Removed 11 
Brockton 
Original 12 13 23 24-1 Removed 11 
Suffolk 
Original 12 12 14 21 ' Removed 11 
Worcester 
Worcester 
Original 10 13 16 15 11 Removed 11 
Fitchburg 
Original 19 11 17 21 6 Removed 22 
§22.5. Transfer Act. Originally adopted in 1958, the Transfer Act1 
has allowed the Superior Court "after determination that if the plain-
tiff prevails, there is no reasonable likelihood that recovery will exceed 
one thousand dollars," to transfer any tort or contract action to an ap-
propriate District Court for trial by a full-time justice, subject to re-
transfer to and retrial in the Superior Court, where the District Court 
decision is given weight as prima facie evidence. Table IV shows the 
operation of the act during the 1962 SURVEY year. To expand its 
scope, in view of the burdens of the Superior Court, the Board of 
Delegates of the Massachusetts Bar Association, upon the recommen-
dation of its special committee on the judiciary, proposed that the 
'Exclusive of contract and motor vehicle tort cases. On July 3. 1962. the interval 
was 18 months. 
Ii On June 29, 1962, the interval was 12 months. 
6 On June 29, 1962, the interval was 18 months. 
§22.5. 1 G.L., c. 231, §102C, inserted by Acts of 1958, c. 369, §!I, as amended by 
Acts of 1960, c. 303. See Lubell v. First National Stores, Inc., 342 Mass. 161. 172 
N.E.2d 689 (1961). 
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transfer limit be increased from $1000 to $3000. The legislature ap-
proved an increase to $2000 and enacted Chapter 305 of the Acts of 
1962 to that effect. 
TABLE IV 
Transfer Act Cases 
District Courts (other than Boston 
Boston Municipal Court) Municipal Court 
1960-61 1961-62 1960-61 1961-62 
Transferred from 
Superior Court 5,967 9,098 3,015 3,910 
Tried in District 
Courts 1,414 1,684 563 738 
Retransferred to 
Superior Court 544 716 216 253 
Pending in District 
Courts 2,300 5,205 1,744 2,175 
§22.6. Increase in the number of justices of the Superior Court. 
Chapter 721 of the Acts of 1962 added four justices to the Superior 
Court, bringing the number of associate justices to forty-one. This 
increase was the result of a proposal of the Board of Delegates of the 
Massachusetts Bar Association, upon the recommendation of the asso-
ciation's special committee on the judiciary, advising the addition of 
eight justices to the court. The last increase was in 1958, when eight 
judgeships were created. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURTS 
§22.7. Business of the courts. District Court business, shown in 
Table V, discloses an increase in almost every category. The figures, 
together with the Trausfer Act figures in Table IV, also show that 
during the 1962 SURVEY year each of the fifty full-time judgeships in 
TABLE V 
District Court Business 1 
(Other than Boston Municipal Court) 
Civil writs entered 
Civil cases tried (other 
than summary process) 
Summary process entries 
Summary process trials 
1958-59 
73,988 
8,467 
9,151 
2,511 
1959-60 
74,066 
6,596 
9,588 
2,603 
1960-61 
80,722 
6,687 
9,923 
2,754 
1961-62 
83,539 
8,044 
.9,775 
3,024 
§22.7. 1 Transfer Act cases are not reflected in any of the figures in this table. 
See Table IV for these figures. 
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1958·59 1959·60 1960·61 
Removals to the 
Superior Court 7,020 4,447 4,842 
Reported to Appellate 
Division 6S 74 87 
Appealed to Supreme 
Judicial Court 12 13 8 
Small claims 68,192 72,091 76,565 
Criminal cases begun 242,208 263,683 273,760 
Criminal appeals 4,382 4,721 4,784 
Automobile cases 
(criminal) 132,452 142,845 156,749 
Juveniles under 17 9,153 9,378 9,239 
Parking tickets 
returned 798,98S 910,414 992,292 
TABLE VI 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act Cases in District Courts 
(Other than Boston Municipal Court) 
Number of cases initiated 
Number of cases received 
from other states 
Amount collected 
1959·60 
1,167 
539 
$1,198,473 
1960·61 
1,203 
536 
$1,401,215 
299 
1961·62 
5,216 
112 
13 
75,564 
304,254 
5,026 
177,889 
9,754 
1,101,198 
1961·62 
1,313 
636 
$1,672,561 
the forty·six full· time courts averaged 195 trials of civil cases, exclud-
ing summary process actions and Worcester's six·member jury cases. 
If vacancies and illnesses are taken into account, it is evident that the 
average for each of the full· time judges exceeded 200 trials. 
§22.8. Six-member juries in criminal cases. The 1961 SURVEY dis-
cussed legislation of that year permitting six·member juries in certain 
criminal cases in the Central District Court of Worcester and the Third 
District Court of Eastern Middlesex in Cambridge.1 In the first of 
these courts the trial was on appeal from misdemeanor convictions in 
any District Court in Worcester County, whereas in the second court 
the trial was an original trial of "any criminal proceeding." During 
the 1962 SURVEY year the Worcester act was amended by permitting 
defendants who may have already appealed their convictions to the 
Superior Court to substitute an appeal for a trial by a jury of six in 
the Central District Court of Worcester.2 The Cambridge act was so 
unsatisfactory that it was repealed and was replaced by legislation, 
identical with the amended Worcester act, allowing trials by juries 
of six in the District Court at Cambridge upon appeals from misde· 
§22.8. 11961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §21.10. 
2 Acts of 1962, c. 252. 
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meanor convictions in any District Court in Middlesex County.s Still 
in the experimental stage, the Worcester act produced 125 appeals for 
trials by juries of six during the 1962 SURVEY year. Of this number, 
III cases were disposed of. 
§22.9. Six-member juries in Worcester civil cases. The number of 
civil cases tried to a verdict before six-member juries in the Central 
District Court of Worcester, the only court providing for such trials, 
increased from 28 and 27 in the 1960 and 1961 SURVEY years respec-
tively to 44 during the 1962 SURVEY year. 
D. THE PROBATE COURTS 
§22.10. Equity jurisdiction in the Probate Courts. Equity jurisdic-
tion in the Probate Courts has been confined to specific matters in-
cidental to their traditional business. A proposal to remove this 
limitation by giving the Probate Courts general equity jurisdiction 
was advanced in 1960 but was opposed by the Judicial Council 1 and 
failed in the legislature. During the past SURVEY year, however, a 
modified measure was successful, resulting in the enactment of Chapter 
567 of the Acts of 1962. 
The new act authorizes any justice of the Superior Court to transfer 
for disposition in a Probate Court "any proceeding in equity," other 
than labor disputes, subject to the approval of the transfer by the chief 
justice of the Superior Court, the Administrative Committee of the 
Probate Courts and the judge, or a majority of judges if more than 
one, of the Probate Court of the county to which the case is to be 
transferred. It is evident that by placing the initiative for a transfer 
in the hands of a justice of another court and by conditioning a trans-
fer on a series of approvals of other authorities, the new act is greatly 
attenuated. Its operation will be watched with great interest. 
E. OTHER MATTERS 
§22.11. Contingent fees. During the 1962 SURVEY year the case of 
Sullivan v. Goulette1 dealt with the validity of an agreement for a 
contingent fee for legal services. The controversy arose out of bene-
ficiaries' objections to an account of an administratrix showing pay-
ments to attorneys who had successfully prosecuted a death action in 
respect of the deceased pursuant to a "contract [as stated in findings 
by the trial judge] to prosecute the death claim . . . for 50% of the 
verdict." In support of a decree allowing a fee equal to one third of 
SId., c. 457. Repeal of the Cambridge act had been recommended by the Judi-
cial Council. Thirty-seventh Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144 
(1961), p. 13. 
§22.l0. 1 Thirty-seventh Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144 (1960), 
p.55. 
§22.11. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 743, 182 N.E.2d 519. See §4.5 supra for further 
comment on this case. 
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the amount recovered, the probate judge made findings from which 
he concluded that an implied term of the agreement was an under-
standing that the attorney's fee was to be subject to the approval of 
the Probate Court. Relying heavily on this finding, and holding it to 
be warranted by the evidence, which had been reported, the Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled that the agreement was to be regarded as provid-
ing for a fee that in any event was not to be more than reasonable 
compensation as determined by the Probate Court. 
Of special interest in the Supreme Judicial Court's consideration of 
the case was a reargument ordered, with an invitation to bar associa-
tions and others to submit briefs as amici curiae, principally on the 
question whether it was reasonable to continue to apply the Massachu-
setts rule to the effect: 
(1) that an agreement for a contingent fee for legal services in liti-
gation is void for champerty, if the attorney's services will not give 
rise to a debt from the client and the attorney's prospective share 
of a recovery is to be his only compensation, and (2) that such an 
agreement will not be saved from champerty solely by an arrange-
ment that the client is to furnish the necessary money to pay ex-
penses. 
The Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations and others filed 
briefs on the specified issue, taking the position that Massachusetts 
law should now recognize the validity of an attorney's fee contract for 
a reasonable percentage of the proc~eds of a claim. Reference was 
made to the great weight of authority elsewhere upholding such con-
tracts, and arguments were made in support of their ethical basis and 
social utility. The distinctions of the existing Massachusetts rule in 
seeking to draw the line between valid and champertous agreements 
were challenged as being so formalistic as to present primarily an exer-
cise in astute draftsmanship to the initiated. 
Acknowledging the assistance of the amici curiae, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, upon further examination of the record in Sullivan v. 
Goulette, was able to reach its decision without disturbing existing 
doctrine. Yet the Court did note the suggestions that the existing law 
of champerty be reconsidered, and significantly observed, "It may be 
that the subject should be dealt with by appropriate court rules." 
§22.12. No-fix traffic tickets. The 1961 SURVEY discussed the adop-
tion of the no-fix traffic ticket law, and certain deficiencies were noted.1 
Chapter 789 of the Acts of 1962 repealed the 1961 statute and replaced 
it with a law transferring from the District Courts to the Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles the responsibility for issuing books of tickets and keep-
ing a record of their disposition. The new act also prescribes the de-
tails of the various forms to be used, authorizes voiding of tickets and 
eliminates the provision for a mandatory thirty-day suspension of a li-
cense upon the issuance of three warnings within a year.· The basic 
§22.l2. 11961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §21.l2. 
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defect in the original statute, the lack of finality of the decision of the 
officer at the scene of the violation, continues unchanged. 
§22.13. Massachusetts Defenders Committee. The 1960 SURVEY 
discussed the legislation of that year establishing the Massachusetts 
Defenders Committee, an eleven-member body to be appointed by 
the Judicial Council and charged with the responsibility of provid-
ing counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases.1 Chapter 366 
of the Acts of 1962 amended the original statute by transferring the 
appointing authority to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
§22.14. Salaries of judges and clerks. The special legislative com-
mission on the judicial system was given a particular mandate to study 
salary schedules. After a careful study, which examined comparable 
salaries in other states, the commission proposed certain increases, espe-
cially for Justices of the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts. The 
commission also recommended that the existing arrangements whereby 
the salaries of clerks, registers and others are fixed at a specified per-
centage of the salaries of the judges of their courts be ended. An im-
mediate 10 percent increase for administrative personnel was, however, 
proposed on condition that the Executive Secretary to the Justices of 
the Supreme Judicial Court was given enlarged functions with author-
ity to establish salary schedules for administrative personnel. 
The legislature refused to raise the salaries of the judges,1 and it 
declined to expand the functions of the Executive Secretary. It did 
nevertheless increase by 10 percent the salaries of the county clerks 
and the Superior Court clerks in Suffolk County, setting their salaries 
at definite dollar amounts, thus freeing them from the grounded judi-
cial kite.2 Salaries of assistant clerks were set at varying percentages 
of the salaries of the clerks of their courts. 
§22.l3. 11960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.14. 
§22.14. 1 By Chapter 680 of the Acts of 1962 the legislature did. however. in-
crease by $1000 the salaries of the justices of the Boston Municipal Court. bringing 
them to $16.000 for associate justices ($17.000 for the chief justice). but this was 
done only to make the salaries of the associate justices the same as those of full-
time judges in the other District Courts under Chapter 379 of the Acts of 1961. 
2 Acts of 1962. c. 781. 
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